Why the UK Gender Recognition Act Disempowers Both Trans and Cis Women Alike
In June of this year, The Sunday Times reported that the UK Government had controversially abandoned its proposed reforms to the Gender Recognition Act 2004 (GRA) which would have involved ‘streamlining and de-medicalising’[1] the process by which a transgender individual may obtain legal recognition of their gender identity. In particular, these proposals had sought to replace the existing ‘assessment’ process with a ‘non-assessment based’[2] model—a move which would have substituted the current evidentiary burdens, such as the requirement to adduce a medical report detailing a ‘gender dysphoria’[3] diagnosis, with a simple statutory declaration.[4]
Further cementing this apparent reversal in policy, it has also been reported that the Government intends to ‘safeguard’ female-only spaces, such as refuges and public restrooms, to prevent them being used by ‘those with male anatomy.’[5]
In the light of the recent debate surrounding the GRA, this article focuses on the topic that appears to have received the most polarising coverage: the position of women. Subtly underpinning some discourses seems to be the question of what it means to be a woman—of how one belongs in this gender. Therefore, given this clear desire to delineate the boundaries of womanhood, this article highlights three themes—latent within the existing GRA and apparent Government policy—which arguably disempower both trans and cis women alike.
These themes are as follows: first, an arbitrary conflation of sex and gender, which reduces womanhood (gender) to the biological makeup of the body (sex); second, the pathologisation of transgender identity; and third, the implicit conceptualisation of gender as performance,[6] which vests power over our identities as women in the hands of an observer.
By exploring these themes, this article intends to shed light on how certain strategies—which have historically been employed to curb women’s rights—are being used, perhaps inadvertently, to exclude the experiences of trans women, often under the umbrella of ‘feminism.’
Elucidating the sex-gender conflation: when womanhood is reduced to biological sex
By connecting possible reforms to the gender recognition process in the UK with a discussion surrounding the protection of female-only spaces, it is arguable that the Government has propagated an arbitrary sex-gender conflation which is capable of disempowering trans and cis women alike—the essentialism of our biological sex.
For the purposes of this article, ‘sex’ refers to a clinical determination at birth, based on biological characteristics, such as our reproductive organs and X or Y chromosomes. By contrast, ‘gender’ is a social construct, involving expectations that concern our interests, appearances, conduct, and so on.[7] As such, when this article employs words such as ‘womanhood’ or ‘women,’ reference is being made to gender, whereas terms such as ‘female’ or ‘male’ refer to sex.
The suggestion that the Government plans to ‘protect’[8] female-only spaces—thereby establishing domains of exclusivity that may exclude women ‘with male anatomy’—artificially divides our lived experiences as women into in-or-out spaces of anatomical belonging. Sex then becomes an arbitrary marker that splits the very similar and very different experiences of all women into a hierarchy of two sisterhoods—here, the sisterhood of trans women may be separated from that of their cis neighbours, purely on account of their sex determination at birth.
One might contend, however, that this division pertains only to individuals with male anatomy, including some trans women, and does not extend to all trans women whose sex was determined as male at birth. For example, it could be argued that some women whose sex was recorded as male at birth, but who do not or no longer possess male anatomy, may not be excluded from female-only spaces. However, given the limitless possibilities in defining ‘male anatomy,’ this article assumes, as a reasonable reference point, that the exclusion of persons with male anatomy from female-only locations has the potential to disproportionately apply to trans women—both to women who possess a birth certificate with a ‘male’ sex marker and to women who, prior to the reissuance of their birth certificate, were recorded as male at birth.
A possible consequence of this hierarchy is that, while two equally vulnerable women—one cis and the other trans—may present at a female-only refuge with the same experience of gender-related violence, only the former may be permitted entry on the Government’s apparent logic. As regards the latter, she may be denied entry precisely to ‘safeguard’ the female-only nature of this space. As such, the Government’s message to trans women seems to be as follows: no matter how significant your experience as a woman of rape or domestic abuse or homelessness may be, it is not deserving of the same recognition as that of a cis woman.
By so reducing womanhood to the sex with which we were recorded at birth, our fluid lived experiences—which simultaneously define and are defined by our gender identities as women—are capable of arbitrary invalidation and exclusion for both trans and cis women alike. The essence of a woman is rendered static, being limited purely to our (perceived) possession of ovaries. For the cis woman, the logical consequence of this essentialism of female sex is that her voice—and, by extension, her value—as a woman may extend only as far as is permitted by her biology. So, by applying this sex-based reasoning to justify the exclusion of trans women from female-only spaces, what is to stop it also being used to justify preventing the female sex from enjoying advantages deemed the exclusive preserve of the biological male? On this logic, she could be denied equal pay on the basis of her sex, or perhaps even the right to access further education—such domains being classed, hypothetically, as male-only spaces of belonging.
Therefore, it is arguable that the Government’s attempt to ‘protect’ female-only spaces—by supposedly excluding all non-cis women from entry—is implicitly underpinned by an essentialism of biological sex, which is equally capable of disempowering cis women in other contexts. Taken to its logical conclusion, this arbitrary separation of trans and cis women on the basis of sex unearths a subtle strategy for perpetuating gender inequality on a potentially unlimited scale.
Elucidating the sex-gender conflation: when our bodies betray us
By artificially conflating sex and gender so as to invalidate, perhaps inadvertently, our experiences as women beneath the label of our biological sex, the Government appears to have perpetuated a sentiment which is painfully familiar to trans and cis women alike—that our bodies are capable of being used against us. The destructive impact of this theme is that a woman may be forcibly disassociated from her physical body, in order to disempower her. In fact, following repeated exposure to this sentiment, she soon learns to identify her body as a potential enemy—it lies in wait to betray her.
This sentiment may be observed in popular media, which tend to implicitly pit our bodies against us as women. For example, the endless depiction of young women as sexualised objects—which appears to yield fame, money, and popularity to many—sends the following message: that our ultimate value as women is conditional on the sexual objectification of our bodies, only for us to eventually be replaced by a younger, more ‘attractive,’ and more sexualised version of ourselves, ad infinitum.
In this current climate, the longer your body exists—and consequently, the wiser and more self-perceptive you become—your worth inevitably decreases according to the beauty myth.[9] Here the woman whose body is currently perceived as valuable experiences a pervasive anticipation of loss—for her body is now seen, but is ultimately replaceable. Her body will eventually disappoint her.
The consequence of this conditionality of our value as a woman, according to the beauty myth, is that our bodies are guaranteed to trigger our devaluation. Very soon we will no longer be sufficiently ‘young’ or ‘attractive’ or ‘feminine,’ and so on. The woman’s body thus separates itself from the internal core of her identity, ultimately betraying her, for with time it will deplete her of the empty power that the myth once attributed to her.
It is arguable that the Government’s apparent intention to ‘protect safe spaces for women’[10] reflects this disempowering sentiment. For in supposedly excluding trans women from entry, it propagates the following message: that no matter how genuinely you identify as a woman, your physical body will always betray you. It is therefore no wonder that the trans woman may be left with the consequent impression that she is somehow incomplete, that her lived experiences as a woman will never be entirely valid on account of her sex—it is as though her body is to blame, having denied her the more complete identity of a cis woman.
Ultimately, just as all women hear that we are not ‘womanly’ enough to be valued as women (gender), just so, through her exclusion from female-only spaces, the trans woman is being told that she is not ‘female’ enough to be included (sex). Here, the sex-gender conflation implicit within the Government’s alleged proposal echoes the betrayal of the body that is so frequently employed to disempower both cis and trans women more generally.
The pathologisation of transgender identity
In its current form, the GRA requires an individual to adduce two medical reports[11] as evidence to support their application for a gender recognition certificate—their sole statement that they self-identify as a gender different to that which they were assigned at birth is not sufficient. In particular, the standard path[12] to obtaining a gender recognition certificate requires that the applicant ‘has or has had gender dysphoria’[13] and, further, that they adduce evidence, in the form of a medical report, detailing this diagnosis.[14]
Despite the fact that gender dysphoria is no longer classified under ‘Mental and Behavioural Disorders’[15] in the International Classification of Diseases, the GRA arguably contains undertones of transgender identity being perceived as a norm deviation-inducing factor—as a pathological phenomenon that ‘abnormalises’ somebody whose gender identity would otherwise be ‘normal.’[16] This can be observed, for example, in the legal requirement to have been diagnosed with gender dysphoria—which applies when an individual is ‘experiencing discomfort or distress’ because of a difference between their ‘gender identity, sex assigned at birth or sex-related physical characteristics.’[17] It is particularly noteworthy that, while gender dysphoria is not experienced by all transgender individuals, the GRA requires, as a condition of legal recognition in the standard application route, this diagnosis to have been made.
To illustrate this pathologisation of transgender identity, let us draw a parallel with the now outdated medical diagnosis of ‘female hysteria.’[18] Like with dysphoria—which connotes a state of significant disquiet or unhappiness within oneself[19]—female hysteria was typically associated with volatile symptoms, including irritability, anxiety, and insomnia.[20] Employed as a means of gaslighting a woman, the related image of the ‘hysterical female’—her sex being necessarily intertwined with her instability—arguably mirrors the requirement of a gender dysphoria diagnosis under the GRA. For just as female sex provides the essential context for her descent into hysteria, just so the legal recognition of one’s transgender identity under the GRA essentialises a gender dysphoria diagnosis. The implicit message within the GRA appears to be that the legal recognition of somebody’s true gender is necessarily intertwined with their gender dysphoria diagnosis—in other words, they must adduce evidence that they have experienced discomfort or distress within themselves because of, or in the context of, their transgender identity, before their true gender will be legally recognised.
Therefore, through this diagnosis requirement, the GRA arguably expects the transgender individual to acknowledge the state of affairs in which one’s gender identity aligns with one’s sex as the (healthy) norm. To then apply for their true gender identity to be legally recognised, they must admit—and adduce medical evidence of—their ‘abnormality.’ In other words, they are required to prove their own state of unease in so deviating from this norm in order to acquire a gender recognition certificate.
So, when our identities receive legal recognition only when we admit—whether directly or otherwise—that we are abnormal, equal respect and dignity cannot logically follow. Here the GRA arguably disempowers both trans and cis women by enforcing a pathologising sentiment upon the former which has historically been employed to gaslight the latter.
To perform one’s gender
The GRA appears to be implicitly underpinned by an understanding of gender as performance. This is reflected, for example, in the requirement that the applicant satisfy to the Gender Recognition Panel (‘the Panel’) that they have socially transitioned for at least two years prior to the application.[21] Thus, to acquire legal recognition of their identity, it must be externally evidenced to others—being internal alone is insufficient. It is arguable that this requirement echoes the perspective that an individual’s gender is a continual performance through which they aim to convince the onlooker of their internal identity using a shared language of verbal and visual signifiers.
Take, for example, the corporate-driven association of the colour pink with girls, and blue with boys. This externally-imposed language of gender identification has become an objectively recognisable template through which an individual may communicate their gender identity. In fact, as a child I recall being influenced by environmental cues—such as through advertisements and film portrayals—as to the performance expectations of the archetypal girl, such that, when somebody would ask me my favourite colour, I would respond, like most girls my age, with ‘pink.’ Although I may not have given much thought to this question at the time, answering with ‘pink’ was my way of communicating a response that I knew would be well-received as objectively recognisable and which would identify myself as belonging in my gender.
But I now wonder why I felt the need—consciously or otherwise—to identify my gender in this way. I realise that such a drive may not have been an internal one, but rather externally imposed. This is because, through my exposure to continual reminders of the objective expectations—language templates—of my gender, I believe that by identifying with the colour pink I was seeking the safety of an identity presentation that would guarantee me a certain level of communal belonging. And this sense of belonging—which we see in Barbie doll advertisements, in our bedroom décor, and in pink dresses at festivities—provides a safe guarantee that your identity will be received as recognisable, while providing a mask beneath which you may hide your true self, if you so choose.
When, as women or girls, we often hide our true selves beneath a gender performance, it is arguable that we vest in the onlooker a power—albeit impartial or even minimal—over our identities, and they do the same to us. This is a power to assess us according to an objective scale of what is deemed sufficiently ‘girly’ or ‘womanly’ to be mutually recognisable. A similar sentiment appears to feature within the GRA where, in requiring a convincing performance of one’s gender identity, the Panel possesses the power to assess the transgender person’s satisfaction of the social transitioning requirement.
However, when the language of gender performance may, for whatever reason, conceal elements of a woman’s gender identity from her observer, the requirement under the GRA for a trans woman to have ‘lived’[22]—to have socially presented—as a woman for a minimum of two years may vest power over her identity in a Panel employing a similar language of artifice. As such, like the assessor of the cis woman, the trans woman’s observer possesses the power to assess her gender conformity, without always seeing her. And unless we women are seen and accepted for who we truly are—without these artificial expectations of gender performance—we will be unable to tackle the language templates that are so frequently used to constrain us.
Conclusion
This article has highlighted certain limiting themes that appear to underpin the GRA and which may unite, rather than divide, the lived experiences of all women. Thus, while it is important to hear all perspectives on reforming the GRA, without dismissing them outright, let us recognise that feminism is not about delineating separate categories of belonging, but about breaking down artificial barriers to gender equality—barriers that, in this context, serve to disempower both trans and cis women alike.
Article tags: | identity | transgender rights | feminism | beauty myth |
This article intends to shed light on how certain strategies—which have historically been employed to curb women’s rights—are being used, perhaps inadvertently, to exclude the experiences of trans women, often under the umbrella of ‘feminism.’ Image source: CNN
For the purposes of this article, ‘sex’ refers to a clinical determination at birth, based on biological characteristics, such as our reproductive organs and X or Y chromosomes. By contrast, ‘gender’ is a social construct, involving expectations that concern our interests, appearances, conduct, and so on. Image source: Samuel Kubani / AFP via Getty Images
It is arguable that the Government’s attempt to ‘protect’ female-only spaces—by supposedly excluding all non-cis women from entry—is implicitly underpinned by an essentialism of biological sex, which is equally capable of disempowering cis women in other contexts. Image source: Washington Examiner
Just as all women hear that we are not ‘womanly’ enough to be valued as women (gender), just so, through her exclusion from female-only spaces, the trans woman is being told that she is not ‘female’ enough to be included (sex). Image source: Donna Grethen / Op-Art
The GRA arguably disempowers both trans and cis women by enforcing a pathologising sentiment upon the former which has historically been employed to gaslight the latter. Image source: JGoldcrown Studio / Marco Feng
As a child I recall being influenced by environmental cues—such as through advertisements and film portrayals—as to the performance expectations of the archetypal girl, such that, when somebody would ask me my favourite colour, I would respond, like most girls my age, with ‘pink.’ Image source: Shutterstock
Let us recognise that feminism is not about delineating separate categories of belonging, but about breaking down artificial barriers to gender equality—barriers that, in this context, serve to disempower both trans and cis women alike. Image source: Angela Weiss / AFP / Getty
Search by Tag
-
While it may be unbeknownst to some, references to Greta Thunberg's U.N. Climate Action Summit address as a "meltdo… https://t.co/5kEEFQELep
Related articles
Sources Cited
[1] Benjamin Butterworth, ‘British Prime Minister Theresa May: “Being Trans is not an Illness’ (PinkNews, 19 October 2017) <https://www.pinknews.co.uk/2017/10/19/british-prime-minister-theresa-may-being-trans-is-not-an-illness/> accessed 7 August 2020.
[2] LGBT Policy Team, ‘Reform of the Gender Recognition Act - Government Consultation’ (2018) <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/721725/GRA-Consultation-document.pdf> accessed 6 August 2020.
[3] Gender Recognition Act 2004 (GRA 2004), s 2(1)(a)
[4] Owl, ‘The UK is becoming even more unsafe for trans people like me’ (MetroUK, 17 June 2020) <https://metro.co.uk/2020/06/17/scrapping-gender-recognition-act-reform-12861372/> accessed 7 August 2020.
[5] Tim Shipman, ‘Boris Johnson scraps plan to make gender change easier’ (The Sunday Times, 14 June 2020) <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/boris-johnson-scraps-plan-to-make-gender-change-easier-zs6lqfls0> accessed 7 August 2020.
[6] Judith Butler, ‘Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist Theory’ (1988) 40 Theatre Journal 519, 531.
[7] LGBT Policy Team (n 2) 7.
[8] Ben Hunte, ‘Gender Recognition Act: LGBT political group anger at trans law “changes”’ (BBC, 20 June 2020) <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-53101071> accessed 8 August 2020.
[9] Naomi Wolf, The Beauty Myth: How Images of Beauty Are Used Against Women (Vintage 1991).
[10] Hunte (n 8).
[11] GRA 2004, s 3(1).
[12] LGBT Policy Team (n 2) 18.
[13] GRA 2004, s 2(1)(a).
[14] ibid s 3(2).
[15] Terry Reed, ‘The Gender Recognition Act Discussion (July 2019)’ (Gender Identity Research and Education Society, 22 July 2019) <https://www.gires.org.uk/the-gender-recognition-act-discussion-july-2019/> accessed 8 August 2020.
[16] Wynne Parry, ‘Normal or Not? When One’s Gender Identity Causes Distress’ (Live Science, 3 June 2013) <https://www.livescience.com/37087-dsm-gender-dysphoria.html> accessed 7 August 2020.
[17] ‘Transgender facts’ (Mayo Clinic, 1 September 2017) <https://www.mayoclinic.org/healthy-lifestyle/adult-health/in-depth/transgender-facts/art-20266812> accessed 7 August 2020.
[18] Ada McVean, ‘The History of Hysteria’ (McGill Office for Science and Society, 31 July 2017) <https://www.mcgill.ca/oss/article/history-quackery/history-hysteria> accessed 7 August 2020.
[19] ‘Dysphoria’ (Cambridge Dictionary) <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/dysphoria> accessed 7 August 2020.
[20] McVean (n 18).
[21] 'Ryan Butcher, ‘Majority of women support trans people’s right to self-identify despite years of relentless transphobia eye-opening polling finds’ (PinkNews, 9 July 2020) <https://www.pinknews.co.uk/2020/07/09/trans-self-identify-liz-truss-gender-recognition-act-yougov-polling-women-dawn-butler/> accessed 8 August 2020.
[22] GRA 2004, s 2(1)(b).