Not Quite Persons? Exploring Various Similarities Between Humans and Non-Human Animals
In June 2005, it was reported that three lions chased away the abductors of a twelve-year-old girl in Ethiopia. They stayed with her for roughly half a day, protecting her until the police and her family discovered her, before moving on.[1]
The girl informed the police that, whereas she had been repeatedly beaten by her abductors, the lions had never tried to hurt her, a claim which drew scepticism from wildlife experts because lions are notoriously aggressive towards humans. Some theorised that the girl’s crying could have been mistaken for the distressed mewing sounds of a lion cub.[2] But what if there was something more to it? After all, is it really conceivable that three lions would protect a vulnerable human who is unknown to them in a possible case of mistaken species?
The seventeenth century philosopher, René Descartes, believed that humans—as rational and conscious beings—are separate from, and superior to, non-human animals, which are non-rational and unconscious.[3] The perception that animals are reducible to unfeeling machines—or automata— dominated in Europe until the mid-nineteenth century and continues to be widespread today among members of the general population.
In the nineteenth century, the naturalist and geologist, Charles Darwin, deviated from this grain of thought with his determination that all human and non-human animals evolved from a common ancestor in a process he termed, ‘natural selection.’ From this, he concluded that the mental capacities of human and non-human animals ‘differed only in degree, not kind.’[4]
Over the past few decades, research has pushed scientific consensus about the animal world towards a more Darwinian view. For instance, it is now scientifically accepted that certain animal species—such as corvids, cetaceans, and primates—have abilities that were historically believed to be unique to humans, such as the ability to use tools, develop individual cultures, and use language.[5]
However, despite the scientific consensus that humans and non-human animals share certain biological traits, animals are still treated very differently to humans—and often inhumanely—across the globe. For instance, although the UK Animal Welfare Act 2006 recognises that vertebrate animals are sentient beings, animals are not accorded legal personhood in the UK. As a legal designation, ‘personhood’ means that an entity ‘has the capacity for rights or responsibilities.’[6] Corporations, for instance, are considered in law to have personhood[7] and it has also been recognised in Argentina that an orangutan may possess this legal status, specifically as ‘a non-human person.’[8] However, such status is denied to animals in the UK.
Consequently, if non-human animals are ‘not quite [legal] persons’ in the UK,[9] despite our biological similarities, then what more would be required for animals to possess this legal designation? And, in the context of animals, what would such ‘personhood’ entail? For instance, would it involve a right to life and/or freedom for sentient animals?
Neurological similarities between humans and some non-human animals
To begin with, it is apparent that humans and some non-human animals share similarities in our neurological processes. For example, humans have mirror neurons in our brains, which are important for various types of social interaction. These are cells which respond both when we perform a specific motor act and when we observe someone else performing this same act. These neurons also appear in the brains of some animals, such as macaques and songbirds,[10] which some scientists believe is a biological indication that they may also possess their own cultures.[11]
Additionally, rats have neurological processes which are similar to those responsible for emotions in humans.[12] Consequently, some scientists believe that certain animals possess the neurological potential to have a human-like ‘consciousness.’
However, in considering whether non-human animals should be accorded legal personhood, it is debatable whether this human-like ‘consciousness’ should suffice or whether they should be required to possess additional, psychological or moral layers of (human) selfhood.[13] This could include, for instance, an understanding of cause and effect (in other words, that certain actions have consequences), an ability to empathise, or a moral sense of right and wrong.
Self-awareness as self-recognition
The meaning of ‘self-awareness’ is disputed and has been the subject of much scientific investigation. For example, a definition of self-awareness as involving recognising one’s reflection is used in the experimental ‘mirror test,’ which was designed in 1970 by Gordon Gallup Jr. In his initial experiment, Gallup placed a red mark on the faces of his subjects—here, chimpanzees—and observed their reactions when a mirror was placed in front of them. Upon noticing their reflection, the chimpanzees would repeatedly touch the marks on their faces. The implication of Gallup’s mirror test is that, like humans, chimpanzees are capable of self-awareness—here defined as self-recognition.[14]
Since Gallup’s initial study, other animals have also demonstrated this self-awareness, such as elephants, dolphins, magpies, and even cleaner wrasses (a type of fish). However, there are many other animals which have reportedly failed, such as sea lions, the grey parrot, some macaque species, and dogs.[15]
There have been many advancements in scientific understanding since the mirror test was first developed. For example, a ‘sniff test’ alternative to the mirror test was developed for dogs which revealed that dogs also possess self-awareness. Given that dogs generally rely more heavily on their sense of smell, it has become apparent that the mirror test of self-recognition—which focuses on the subject’s sight—artificially narrows our assessment of self-awareness to one, out of the five, basic human senses.[16]
Empathy and the Self-Other Distinction
Beyond the mirror test understanding of self-awareness as involving self-recognition, there are other similarities that some non-human animals share with humans that could potentially support an argument for their legal personhood. For instance, there is evidence that humans and some non-human animals share an ability to empathise.
Such empathy has been demonstrated in scientific tests involving laboratory rats. In 2011, in a study in which pairs of rats were placed together in a cage—one of which was held in a clear tube in the centre of the cage and the other of which was unrestrained and free to roam—most of the unrestrained rats were documented attempting to free their companion from the tube. Scientists concluded that this test evidenced behaviour—in which one rat would attempt to help the other—which was ‘triggered by empathy.’[17]
In addition to empathy, humans and some non-human animals also share a form of mutual recognition, according to which one is able to recognise similarities with, and differences from, others. Understood through the prism of a ‘self-other’ distinction, there are scientific tests which demonstrate that some species are able to recognise other members of their own species as being like (or unlike) them, with similar (or different) objectives and preferences.
For example, chimpanzees are known for their dominant power struggles and sometimes brutal behaviour. Between 1974 and 1978, the Gombe Chimpanzee War in Tanzania involved such power struggles between two rival chimpanzee communities, resulting in vicious attacks, killings, and kidnappings of members.[18] What is noteworthy about such behaviour is that the chimpanzees in either community were able to recognise each other as either belonging or not belonging to their particular group, thereby demonstrating a self-other awareness that mirrors that which we find in human communities.
Conclusion
Given that humans and some non-human animals share similarities relating to our neurological processes, our self-awareness, and our ability to empathise with (and/or distinguish ourselves from) others, then the following question should be asked: what more would be required for certain non-human animals to be accorded legal personhood? And, further, if such legal personhood were recognised in the context of non-human animals, would this possibly result in animals possessing specific rights and/or freedoms similar to human rights? In other words, should the legal status of humans and non-human animals be ultimately determined by our similarities or our differences?
Article tags: | -ism | environmentalism | heritage |
If non-human animals are ‘not quite [legal] persons’ in the UK, despite our biological similarities, then what more would be required for animals to possess this legal designation? Image source: ‘Liberation’ by Keri Aitken
Mirror neurons are cells which respond both when we perform a specific motor act and when we observe someone else performing this same act. These neurons also occur in the brains of some animals, such as macaques and songbirds. Image source: stock.adobe.com
The implication of Gallup’s mirror test is that, like humans, chimpanzees are capable of self-awareness—here defined as self-recognition. Image source: Pxfuel
What is noteworthy about the Gombe Chimpanzee War is that the chimpanzees in either community were able to recognise each other as either belonging or not belonging to their particular group, thereby demonstrating a self-other awareness that mirrors that which we find in human communities. Image source: Ian Gilby, Arizona State University
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Sources Cited
[1] Associated Press in Addis Ababa, ‘Lions Save Girl from Kidnappers’ (The Guardian, 22 June 2005) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/jun/22/3> accessed 6 October 2022.
[2] ‘Ethiopian Girl Reportedly Guarded by Lions’ (NBC News, 21 June 2005) <https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna8305836> accessed 6 October 2022.
[3] Joseph Call, ‘Descartes’ Two Errors: Reason and Reflection in the Great Apes’ in Susan Hurley and Matthew Nudds (eds) Rational Animals? (OUP 2006) 220.
[4] ‘Animal Minds’ (The Economist) <https://www.economist.com/news/essays/21676961-inner-lives-animals-are-hard-study-there-evidence-they-may-be-lot-richer-science-once-thought> accessed 6 October 2022.
[5] ibid.
[6] Rachel Fobar, ‘Happy the Elephant is Not a Person, New York’s Highest Court Rules’ (National Geographic, 14 June 2022) <https://www.nationalgeographic.com/animals/article/happy-the-elephant-is-not-a-person-new-yorks-highest-court-rules> accessed 6 October 2022.
[7] MM2049, ‘Corporations and Corporate Personhood - Should They be Morally Responsible? (Part 1)’ (University of Kent Law and the Humanities Blog, 4 June 2019) <https://blogs.kent.ac.uk/lawandthehumanities/2019/06/04/corporations-and-corporate-personhood-should-they-be-morally-responsible-part-1/> accessed 6 October 2022.
[8] Guardian Staff and Agencies, ‘Orangutan Sandra Granted Personhood Settles Into New Florida Home’ (The Guardian, 7 November 2019) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/nov/07/sandra-orangutan-florida-argentina-buenos-aires> accessed 6 October 2022.
[9] Angela Fernandez, ‘Not Quite Property, Not Quite Persons: A “Quasi” Approach for Nonhuman Animals’ (2019) 5 Can J Comp & Contemp L 155, 155.
[10] Wataru Suzuki and others, ‘Mirror Neurons in a New World Monkey, Common Marmoset’ (2015) 9(459) Front Neurosci <https://doi.org/10.3389/fnins.2015.00459> accessed 6 October 2022.
[11] Jason Marsh, ‘Do Mirror Neurons Give Us Empathy?’ (Greater Good Magazine, 29 March 2012) <https://greatergood.berkeley.edu/article/item/do_mirror_neurons_give_empathy> accessed 6 October 2022.
[12] ‘Animal Minds’ (n 4).
[13] Karl Friston, ‘Am I Self-Conscious? (Or Does Self-Organization Entail Self-Consciousness?)’ 9(579) Front Psychol <https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00579> accessed 6 October 2022.
[14] Gordon G Gallup Jr, James R Anderson and Daniel J Shillito, ‘The Mirror Test’ in Marc Bekoff, Colin Allen and Gordon M Burghardt (eds), The Cognitive Animal: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives on Animal Cognition (MIT Press 2002) 325.
[15] Maggie Koerth-Baker, ‘Kids (and Animals) Who Fail Classic Mirror Tests May Still Have Sense of Self’ (Scientific American, 29 November 2010) <https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/kids-and-animals-who-fail-classic-mirror/> accessed 6 October 2022.
[16] National Research Tomsk State University, ‘The Sniff Test of Self-Recognition Confirmed: Dogs Have Self-Awareness: Alternative Approach to the 'Mirror Test' Confirms Hypothesis of Self-Cognition in Dogs’ (ScienceDaily, 5 September 2017) <www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2017/09/170905111355.htm> accessed 6 October 2022.
[17] ‘Rats Show Empathy, Too’ (National Institutes of Health, 19 December 2011) <https://www.nih.gov/news-events/nih-research-matters/rats-show-empathy-too> accessed 6 October 2022.
[18] Matthew Bian, ‘A Brief History of the Gombe Chimpanzee War’ (DISCOVER, 18 September 2021) <https://www.discovermagazine.com/planet-earth/a-brief-history-of-the-gombe-chimpanzee-war> accessed 6 October 2022.